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ABSTRACT: The art of “safely” criticizing the powerful through indirect argument was a well-established 
concept among ancient rhetoricians. It is not difficult to see the usefulness of such indirection in cultures 
where free speech is limited. What use, however, do these arguments have in a democracy? In exploring an 
answer to this question, I consider Montaigne’s “Des Cannibales” (1595) and Emerson’s “Montaigne, or, 
the Skeptic” (1850). 
 





The art of “safely” criticizing the powerful through indirect argument was a well-
established concept among ancient rhetoricians. In the Rhetorica ad Herennium, for 
example, the anonymous author describes the figure of “licentia” as a device for 
exercising a right to speak out before those whom we have reason to fear or revere. But, 
he adds, if this frank speech seems too bitter, “there will be many means of palliation”1 
by which the speaker can soften his remarks. In other authors, most notably Demetrius 
and Quintilian, we see examples of such palliative strategies in the doctrine of “figured 
speech.”2 The rationale behind this softened speech is not only that expressing oneself 
too bluntly might be harmful in some way to the speaker, but that it might also be 
ineffective because the target of the criticism might cease listening altogether. The 
recommended techniques of figured speech vary somewhat depending on the author. 
However, generally we see among the most recommended strategies, the following: 1) 
using an implied meaning for what cannot be spoken; 2) arguing for one thing but really 
intending to accomplish something different; 3) arguing for one thing while actually 
intending to achieve just the opposite; 4) saying to another person what is really meant 
for the one you’re afraid of offending; and 5) when criticizing your audience, including 
yourself in the object
 
1 “multis mitigationibus lenietur” (IV.XXXVII.49). 
2 Other well-developed accounts of figured speech (problemata eschematismena) occur in the works of 
Pseudo-Dionysius, Apsines, and Pseudo-Hermogenes. 
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It is not difficult to see the usefulness of these techniques in cultures that limit free 
speech, such as in imperial Rome or the French monarchy of the sixteenth century. But is 
there any role for covert arguments to play in a democracy? I want to explore this 
question today by considering two essays, both examples of indirection but produced 
under two distinct sets of cultural conditions: Montaigne’s “Des Cannibales” (1595) and 
Emerson’s “Montaigne, or, the Skeptic” (1850). 
 
2. COVERT ARGUMENT IN MONTAIGNE’S “DES CANNIBALES” 
 
The cultural conditions under which Montaigne wrote the Essais, beginning in 1571, 
were dramatic ones: between 1562 and 1598, France was plagued by a series of civil wars 
between Catholics, aligned with the monarchy, and Protestants, who largely represented 
the provincial aristocracy. A few months after the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 
1572, Montaigne’s own home town of Bordeaux was itself the site of an atrocity 
committed by the Sainte Ligue against Protestants. While Montaigne publicly professed 
allegiance to Catholicism and the French monarchy during this period, as François 
Rigolot has noted, this declaration of support may have been more of a humanist 
obligation to preserve the French state at a time of crisis than an unreserved endorsement 
of the Ligue. Given the observations in the Essais on intolerance, torture, and the 
European conquest of the New World, and given that he himself had two brothers who 
were Protestant, it would be hard to believe that he would have approved of the Ligue’s 
excesses. On the other hand, as David Quint has pointed out, Montaigne hardly appears 
sympathetic to the Protestant “individualism” that would justify violent uprising on the 
grounds of religious inspiration (p. x).3 Yet writing directly about the Wars of Religion—
even if only to condemn both sides—would not have allowed his work to win the 
“privilège royal” (which it did in 1580) and, at the very least, it might have led to his 
imprisonment.4  
Recent scholars, such as Quint and before him Géralde Nakam, have insisted that 
we must read the Essais “as a response to the horror of the French civil wars” (Quint 
xiii). In the case of “Des Cannibales,” perhaps the best known of the Essais, Quint has 
argued that  
 
Montaigne’s discussion of the cannibals turns out more than casually to refer to his own France 
and that the terms with which it discusses the Brazilian natives are deeply rooted in his own 
historical and political preoccupations (p. 77). 
 
Agreeing with this interpretation, I want to focus today on the rhetorical means by which 
Montaigne conveys these references to France—that is, I want to examine Montaigne’s 
art of covert argument.5 
                                                 
3 Quint also notes that “Montaigne’s cannibals, who defy their captors and are cooked and eaten, bear an 
unsettling resemblance to the religious martyrs of “De l'yvrongnerie” (2.2), who call upon persecutors to 
roast them in turn” (xii). 
4 In the seventeenth century, Montaigne was in fact placed on the Index. The principal objections against 
the Essais were that their author had 1) used pagan notion of “Fortuna” and Christian “Providence” 
interchangeably; 2) condemned torture; and 3) praised the work of a Protestant poet, Theodore de Bèze. 
5 It is not farfetched to assume that Montaigne would have been familiar with indirection as a rhetorical 
stategy, given his intimate knowledge of rhetorical texts in the Latin tradition (especially Quintilian). In 
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So what are the means of covert argumentation in “Des Cannibales”? We see, first 
of all, a technique of deflection: seeming to argue for one thing but really accomplishing 
something else. The chapter is called “Des Cannibales” and is seemingly about a 
Brazilian tribe that eat their prisoners of war. By calling the Brazilians “cannibals,” 
Montaigne already suggests a likely European judgment about these people: they are 
“cannibalistic savages.” But we see from the first few sentences of the chapter that this 
title is at odds with an idea that Montaigne explicitly foregrounds: we must judge other 
cultures not by what people think but “par la voye de la raison” (p. 208)6 and that, a few 
pages later, “chacun appelle barbarie, ce qui n’est pas de son usage” (p. 211)7. In fact the 
subject of “cannibalism” comes up only three times: once in connection with the 
Brazilians themselves (p. 215), another in connection with the French (p. 216), and again 
in connection with the Gauls (p. 216). So, despite its title, we discover that the chapter is 
not about the practices of cannibals, and in fact the very term “cannibals,” with all its 
connotations of barbarism, is itself called into question. What the chapter is really about 
is Europeans and their attitudes to so-called “barbarous” cultures.  
It is through the figure of emphasis—another strategy of indirection by which the 
writer leaves unstated what he wishes to imply—that we infer a more troubling 
implication about these Europeans. If each person calls "barbaric" any practice that is not 
part of his customary usage, then this would suggest the possibility that Europeans too—
at least from the perspective of those who do not share their customs—may themselves 
be susceptible to a charge of “barbarism.” 
A further strategy of covert argument in Montaigne’s chapter is that of getting his 
readers to recognize their own weaknesses by describing the faults of a third person. We 
see this technique at work, for example, when Montaigne mentions Plato’s reference to 
Solon describing a great island that was once named “Atlantide” (208). This digression 
from the topic that Montaigne has previously introduced—that of the New World—
comes about as Montaigne considers whether the newly discovered American continent 
might be the lost civilization of Atlantis. From Solon’s description, we learn that the 
people of Atlantis were great conquerors and were stopped only by the Athenians in their 
colonial expansion. Yet, both the empire of Atlantis and that of these early Athenians 
were eventually swallowed up by a great flood; for this reason, there is now no trace of 
this civilization. Having suggested the possibility of an association between the New 
World and Atlantis, Montaigne’s digression implies that the present-day European 
conquerors—including those of his own country—may one day suffer a similar fate to the 
people of Atlantis and Athens. Thus, it seems that the glory of colonialism and European 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Considérations sur Cicéron” (I.39), he in fact strongly hints that such a strategy is precisely what is at 
work in his choice of stories and citations: 
 
Ny elles [“histories”], ny mes allegations, ne servent pas tousjours simplement d’exemple, 
d’authorité ou d’ornement. Je ne les regarde pas seulement par l’usage, que j’en tire. Elles portent 
souvent, hors de mon propos, la semence d’une matiere plus riche et plus hardie: et souvent, à 
gauche, un ton plus delicat, et pour moy, qui n’en veux en ce lieu exprimer d’avantage, et pour 
ceux qui rencontreront mon air. (255, Pléiade)  
 
As Charles Rosen remarked last year in the NY Review of Books, this statement amounts to “an open 
invitation to read between the lines” (48, 2/14/08). 
6 “by the ways of reason” (p. 228 Screech). 
7 “any man calls barbarous anything he is not accustomed to” (p. 231 Screech). 
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superiority may not be the immutable truths that Montaigne’s French readers think they 
are.  
Another example of having the readers recognize their own faults in a third person 
is when Montaigne describes the Brazilians with respect to their religion. Prior to 
describing the Brazilian tribe, Montaigne had noted how nations tend to wrongly assume 
that, because they don’t know anything different, they have the “religion parfaicte” and 
the “police parfaicte” (p. 211). Already, then, we sense that Montaigne is calling into 
question his readers’ sense of stability with respect to their own religion and government. 
In an atmosphere where rival religious and political factions are at war precisely because 
they each believe it is their right to control the country, this questioning carries political 
consequences. A few pages later, Montaigne describes the religious practices of the 
“cannibals” as follows: 
 
Ils croyent les ames eternelles ; et celles qui ont bien merité des dieux, estre logées à l’endroit du 
ciel où le Soleil se leve: les maudites, du costé de l’Occident. Ils on je ne sçay quels Prestres et 
Prophetes, qui se presentent bien rarement au peuple, ayans leur demeure aux montaignes. A leur 
arrivée, il se faict une grande feste et assemblée solennelle de plusieurs villages […] Ce Prophete 
parle à eux en public, les exhortant à la vertu et à leur devoir: mais toute leur science ethique ne 
contient que ces deux articles de la resolution à la guerre, et affection à leurs femmes. (p. 214)8 
   
This description suggests some significant parallels between the Brazilians and the 
French. Like the French, the Brazilians believe in an eternal soul and an after-life; they 
also have preachers who urge them to carry out their ethical duties. But here is where the 
parallels seem to cease, for the Brazilians have only two duties: 1) to fight wars and 2) to 
love their wives. In fact, the juxtaposition of violence and love seems incongruous to the 
Christian and even illogical—unless, however, the readers remember their own 
aristocratic values of military honor and family.  
Another practice of the Brazilians that would likely shock the French readers is 
the brutality of the former toward soothsayers who err in their predictions. Whenever a 
prediction turns out to be erroneous, the diviner is immediately labeled a “faux Prophète” 
(p. 214), and as Montaigne tells us, “il est haché en mille pieces” (p. 214).9 From the 
Brazilians’ point of view, Montaigne writes, this is only fitting given that divination is a 
gift from God, and hence pretending to have this gift is the worst possible offense one 
could commit: “[…] faut-il pas les punir, de ce qu’ils ne maintiennent l’effect de leur 
promesse, et de la témérité de leur imposture?” (p. 215).10 Crimes relating to spiritual 
matters, then, require barbaric punishment. What Montaigne does not say here—but 
knows that his audience will understand—is that it is by this very reasoning that both the 
Catholics and the Protestants justify their violence against each another.  
 When towards the middle of the chapter Montaigne eventually discusses the 
actual cannibalism of the Brazilians, he leaves no doubt that he wants his readers to 
                                                 
8 They believe in the immortality of the soul: souls which deserve well of the gods dwell in the sky where 
the sun rises; souls which are accursed dwell where it sets. They have some priests and prophets or other, 
but they rarely appear among the people since they live in the mountains. When they do appear they hold a 
great festival and a solemn meeting of several villages […] The prophet then addresses them in public, 
exhorting them to be virtuous and dutiful, but their entire system of ethics contains only the same two 
articles: resoluteness in battle and love for their wives. (p. 234 Screech) 
9 “hacked to pieces” (p. 234 Screech). 
10 “should they not be punished for it and for the foolhardiness of their deceit?” (p. 235 Screech). 
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reflect on the conduct of their own countrymen. After describing how the Brazilians kill 
their prisoners of war and then feast on them, he remarks:  
 
Je pense qu’il y a plus de barbarie à manger un homme vivant, qu’à le manger mort, à deschirer 
par tourmens et par gehennes, un corps encore plein de sentiment, le faire rostir par le menu, le 
faire mordre et meurtrir aux chiens, et aux pourceaux (comme nous l’avons non seulement leu, 
mas veu de fresche memoire, non entre des ennemis anciens, mais entre des voisins et 
concitoyens, et qui pis est, sous pretexte de pieté et de religion) que de le rostire et manger après 
qu’il est trespassé (p. 216).11 
   
The only difference between us, the French, and them, the “cannibals,” is that we eat 
people while they are alive and they eat them when they are already dead. This allusion to 
reported atrocities that occurred on both sides during the civil wars amounts to a thinly 
veiled accusation against the aristocratic readers. Yet, in extending it, Montaigne is 
careful to employ another tactic of indirection: using "nous" when he means “vous.”  
Thus, he criticizes his readers, while including himself in the object of blame: “Je ne suis 
pas marry que nous remerquons l’horreur barbaresque qu’il y a en une telle action, mais 
ouy bien de quoy jugeans à point de leurs fautes, nous soyons si aveuglez aux nostres 
[…]” (p. 216).12  Similarly he notes that the readers can call the Brazilians barbarous in 
relation to reason, but not in relation to their own behavior: “[…] nous, qui les surpassons 
en toute sorte de barbarie” (p. 216).13  
Who then are the real cannibals? Through its techniques of covert argument, the 
chapter offers its readers an unflattering mirror image of themselves. 
 
3. COVERT ARGUMENT IN EMERSON’S “MONTAIGNE; OR THE SKEPTIC” 
 
Montaigne was writing during a time of intense political and religious turbulence within a 
monarchical regime. It would be tempting to think that the techniques of covert argument 
he employed would have far less relevance in a society that allows frank and open 
discussion about issues of public policy. But, as Demetrius observes, “[…] great and 
powerful democracies often need this type of speech just as much as tyrants” (p. 294), 
and he goes on to cite as an example the Athenian democracy when it exercised 
hegemony over all of Greece. In situations like these, Demetrius argues, critics of the 
government’s policies know that “Flattery is shameful, open criticism is dangerous, and 
the best course lies in the middle, namely innuendo” (p. 294).  
To explore this point, I now turn to the greatest American essayist, who perhaps 
more than any other figure invites comparison with Montaigne. Emerson in fact has more 
in common with Montaigne than it might seem: he lives in a divided country, and at the 
time he wrote the essay I am about to examine, that country is only a decade away from 
                                                 
11“I think there is more barbarity in eating a man alive than in eating him dead; more barbarity in lacerating 
by rack and torture a body still fully able to feel things, in toasting him little by little and having him 
bruised and bitten by pigs and dogs (as we have not only read about but seen in recent memory, not among 
enemies in antiquity but among our fellow-citizens and neighbours – and, what is worse, in the name of 
duty and religion) than in roasting him and eating him after his death” (pp. 235-236 Screech). 
12"It does not sadden me that we should note the horrible barbarity in a practice such as theirs; what does 
sadden me is that, while judging correctly of their wrong-doings we should be so blind to our own" (p. 235 
Screech).  
13 "ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarism" (p. 236 Screech). 
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erupting in a civil war over slavery; what, for Montaigne, was a Protestant/Catholic 
divide, for Emerson, is an Abolitionist/Pro-Slavery divide. Also like Montaigne, 
Emerson’s own engagement is not always easy to pin down. Although he did begin to 
campaign actively against slavery in 1851 (Bloom, p. 2), as Lawrence Buell points out 
one could argue uncharitably that,  
 
His receptivity to abolitionism grew in proportion to its growing strength as a movement and to his 
sense of slavery’s impingement on his region, his state of Massachusetts, and on people he knew 
personally (p. 148).  
 
Buell notes further that in early sermons, Emerson alludes to slavery only briefly and 
places much more emphasis on denouncing materialism.  
Published to popular success just a year before he would openly oppose Daniel 
Webster’s Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, “Montaigne; or the Skeptic” appeared as one of 
seven essays in Representative men (1850). As with the other essays in that volume, it 
was adapted from a series of lectures on historical figures such as Shakespeare, Napoleon 
and Plato, which he had given in England in 1847. When Emerson lectured at the 
Lyceum in Concord (which he frequently did), he understood that the audience expected 
him to avoid “political partisanship” (Buell, p. 25); stating a political position was simply 
not something he was used to doing in his lectures. Furthermore, as he learned from his 
angrily received “Divinity Address” at Harvard in 1838, speaking too frankly could entail 
serious social and political consequences; in Emerson’s case, he was not invited back to 
speak at his alma mater again for two decades.  
In an introduction to William H. Gilman’s 1965 edition of Emerson’s writings, 
Charles Johnson notes that Emerson often writes in a “double-edged” manner, so that his 
remarks can be taken on two levels (p. viii): a remark may be, for example, “a general, 
timeless declaration” (p. viii) about a universal value, but at the same time, “an 
historically specific condemnation” (p. ix). What will interest me with respect to this 
essay is to point out some of these covert “condemnations” and, more importantly, the 
techniques that Emerson uses to make them.  
 As we saw with “Des Cannibales,” the title of Emerson’s essay is deceiving, and 
so the essay suggests an overall strategy of argument by deflection. We expect the essay 
to offer an extended biographical portrait of Montaigne, but while Emerson does briefly 
give such a portrait, it occupies barely a quarter of the whole essay. The essay has three 
major sections: in the first, Emerson describes the constant tension in humanity between 
two extreme philosophical positions (abstractionist/materialist) and asserts that the 
sceptic seeks always to occupy the middleground of these extremes (pp. 690-696); in the 
second section, Emerson presents Montaigne as the representative example of a sceptic 
(pp. 697-701); in the third section, Emerson considers whether Montaigne’s sceptical 
position is a wise one for us to adopt (pp. 701-709). It is in this last section that we see 
the real subject of this essay: the conduct of Emerson himself in the face of societal 
injustices, such as slavery, and by extension, the conduct of the readers themselves.  
Emerson first alludes to this actual theme in the opening paragraph when he 
describes a series of paradoxes that plague all human beings. Among these paradoxes is 
that of a successful capitalist: “A man is flushed with success, and bethinks himself what 
this good luck signifies. He drives his bargain in the streets; but it occurs, that he also is 
bought and sold” (p. 690). This allusion to slavery reminds the readers—who may likely 
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belong to this successful class of man—of an unpleasant truth: it is only by luck, not by 
any merit of his own, that he is not a slave. This should trouble him . 
Two pages later, Emerson further presses this point through an anecdote that 
forces the readers to imagine themselves being judged as slaves:  
 
Spence relates, that Mr. Pope was with Sir Godfrey Kneller, one day, when his nephew, a Guinea 
trader, came in. “Nephew,” said Sir Godrey, “you have the honor of seeing the two greatest men in 
the world.” “I don’t know how great men you may be,” said the Guinea man, “but I don’t like your 
looks. I have often bought a man much better than both of you, all muscles and bones, for ten 
guineas.” Thus, the men of the senses revenge themselves on the professors, and repay scorn for 
scorn. (p. 692) 
 
The story conveys a humorous insult from the materialist slave-trader to the 
abstractionists who assume that their intellect makes them superior to him; in fact, 
physically they are not worth what the slave is. The reason the story seems comical is that 
it seems ridiculous to apply the same criteria to men of learning as to slaves. But, given 
the previous implication that the successful man’s freedom is merely “luck” perhaps this 
idea is not so ridiculous. Emerson suggests, through the voice of a third person, a 
provocative idea that reminds his readers that under other circumstances they too could 
be “weighed by the pound” (p. 692). 
This provocative role towards conservative customs can only belong to the 
sceptic. We need scepticism to fight injustices, like slavery. According to Emerson, we 
rightly prefer those who uphold “a well-ordered society” and “empire” over a 
“nonconformist” who would “say all manner of unanswerable things against the existing 
republic” without offering a constructive alternative (p. 701). Nevertheless, Emerson 
suggests that scepticism offers a reasoned means of calling “custom” into question:   
 
But though we are natural conservers and causationists, and reject a sour, dumpish unbelief, the 
skeptical class, which Montaigne represents, have reason, and every man, at some time belongs to 
it (pp. 701-702).  
 
Scepticism is in fact a “natural weapon against the exaggeration and formalism of bigots 
and blockheads” (p. 702). By implication it should be a model for anyone who wishes to 
fight slavery and intolerance. 
But “the wise sceptic” who heroically doubts in order to voice needed criticism of 
established beliefs is not by any means equivalent to an upstanding citizen: 
 
The superior mind will find itself equally at odds with the evils of society, and with the projects 
that are offered to relieve them. The wise skeptic is a bad citizen; no conservative; he sees the 
selfishness of property, and the drowsiness of institutions. But neither is he fit to work with any 
democratic party that ever was constituted; for parties wish everyone committed, and he penetrates 
the popular patriotism. (p. 702)  
 
In fact, as a result, “It turns out that he is not the champion of the operative, the pauper, 
the prisoner, the slave” (p. 702) Rather, his search for truth is above any blind allegiance 





Now shall we, because a good nature inclines us to virtue’s side say, There are no doubts,—and lie 
for the right?  Is life to be led in a brave or in a cowardly manner? and is not the satisfaction of the 
doubts essential to all manliness? (p. 706).  
 
Doubting is a courageous activity and, without it, society cannot progress. By 
implication, then, Emerson has called into question those among his readers who may see 
themselves as above criticism simply because they belong to the “right” political party.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
What I have tried to suggest today is that the techniques of covert argument occur in 
rhetorical discourse across political cultures, in both “closed” and “open” societies. 
Although argumentation theorists have often recognized such arguments (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, Meyer 1986, Van Eemeren et al. 1996, Amossy 2006), actual 
analyses of how they work from a rhetorical perspective are still too few. One well-
known detailed analysis (Van Eemeren et al. 1996) focuses on an arguer with dubious 
motives, and thus implies an illegitimacy about these techniques: we need to be able to 
analyze indirect arguments so that we are not “taken in” by them. By contrast, part of my 
purpose today has been to offer two “positive” examples of this art and thereby highlight 
its contribution to the rhetorical tradition. 
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